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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Payne appeals from the district court's Judgment. Suspended Sentence,
Order of Probation and Commitment. He asserts that the district court erred when it
prohibited Mr. Payne from presenting his defense that he did not have the requisite
intent to

possess

methamphetamine,

because

methamphetamine long enough to turn it into police.

he

only

had

control

of the

Mr. Payne has a constitutional

right to present his defense including a right to testify regarding his intent.

The

erroneous exclusion of this evidence violated Mr. Payne's due process rights and, as
such, his conviction must be vacated.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's incorrect assertions that
Mr. Payne "contends that he was entitled to explain his motivations regardless of their
relevance," that he contends for the first time on appeal that he has an affirmative
defense, and that because neither of the arguments were presented, they fail to meet
the fundamental error standard. Mr. Payne asserts that the issue presented on appeal
was squarely addressed by the district court. As such, the doctrine of fundamental error
does not apply. Further, he asserts that, in this specific case, as in the cases used to
support his claim, his intent was a relevant issue.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Payne's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it failed to provide Mr. Payne a fair opportunity to present
his complete defense?

2

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. Payne A Fair Opportunity To
Present His Complete Defense

A.

Fundamental Error Does Not Apply
The State has asserted that "Mr. Payne has shown no fundamental error in the

exclusion of evidence of his motive for possessing methamphetamine." (Respondent's
Brief, pp.5-13.)

Mr. Payne agrees that he did not argue that the error in his case

amounted to fundamental error.

However, he did not do so because the issue was

specifically addressed by the district court.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that

ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

State v. Duvalt, 131

Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (citing Sandpoint Convalescent Servs. Inc. v. Idaho Oep't of
Health & Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 2841 (1988)). An exception to this rule, however, has

been applied when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court. Id. (citing
Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 356-57 (1990)).

On the first day of trial, following jury selection, the State submitted an oral
motion in limine asking that Mr. Payne not be allowed to testify regarding "why he
possessed the alleged methamphetamine and what he was planning to do with the
methamphetamine," because such testimony was irrelevant.
L.11.)

(Tr., p.77, L.7 - p.78,

Mr. Payne stated that his defense was going to be that he did possess

methamphetamine, but for a limited time and only to turn it in to law enforcement so that
it could be properly disposed of. (Tr., p.80, Ls.2-6.) The district court agreed that it
would hear additional argument at a later time if Mr. Payne did decide to testify.
(Tr., p.81, Ls.9-14.) At the start of the second day of trial, the State again brought up its
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motion to keep Mr. Payne from testifying about his intent. (Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.91, L.6.)
After some limited additional discussion, the district court again ruled that it would not
rule on the issue in advance. (Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.91, L.17.)
Prior to the defense presenting its case, the State again renewed its motion
arguing the defendant's proffered testimony would be irrelevant. (Tr., p.180, Ls.12-17.)
The State argued that there was no defense of necessity, duress, entrapment, mistake
of law, or mistake of fact. (Tr., p.180, L.22

p.181, L.1.) Defense counsel then argued

that the State had presented testimony of three individuals that had possessed the
methamphetamine for legal purposes, that the State of Idaho has laws on point that
allow for citizens to help enforce the laws of Idaho. (Tr., p.181, L.22 - p.182, L.1.) The
district court then noted that if Mr. Payne was planning on arguing that since others (law
enforcement) had possessed it, the jury should not convict Mr. Payne, that it would not
allow it because it was not proper argument or testimony.

(Tr., p.182, Ls.9-19.)

Defense counsel then argued that,
if there's an exception that is in the hornbooks that is considered to be
regular use exception for law enforcement officers and lab analysts to
have this, then, if a citizen believes he is acting to help enforce the law, he
should be able to present that to the jury and have them review that.
(Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184, L.2.)

The district court then stated that, "if that is your

defense, you're going to have to convince a higher court than this one that it's a proper
defense." (Tr., p.184, Ls.3-5.) The State asked for a clarification of the ruling asking
whether or not the defendant could testify to motives.

(Tr., p.192, Ls.15-17.)

The

district court stated that, "There's a difference between testifying as to what went on and
as to his motives. I guess I'll have to listen as the case proceeds, but my inclination is
to say that motive typically is not a defense to possession." (Tr., p.192, Ls.18-22.)
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On appeal, Mr. Payne has raised issues related to the district court's order
limiting Mr. Payne's presentation of his defense:

that he indented to possess the

methamphetamine only long enough to turn it over to police and that he believed he
was acting on behalf of the police. Therefore, his motive or intent was relevant as it
negated his actual guilt of the crime charged.
Further, although he acknowledges that defense counsel never specified that he
was asserting a specific defense under I.C. § 18-201 (3), the assertions made by
defense counsel are the same as those that would be required to assert this specific
defense. Mr. Payne is not required to utter the magic words to have his claim preserved
for appeal. Because one can understand the basics of his asserted defense without the
specific annotation to the relevant code section, Mr. Payne asserts that this issue is
preserved for appeal.
Therefore, issues related to the presentation of Mr. Payne's defense and intent
were at issue in front of the district court and are preserved for direct appeal. As such, it
is unnecessary to prove fundamental error.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. Payne A Fair Opportunity
To Present His Complete Defense
The State asserts that Mr. Payne has argued that motive is always a defense.

(Respondent's Brief, p.6.)

Mr. Payne has made no such general overreaching

assertion. Simply, he has argued that in this, the case at hand, his intent was relevant.
The State has gone out of its way to suggest that because Mr. Payne has not
mentioned the legal standards for proving the charged possession that somehow that is
"telling" of a deficiency in his appellate case.
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(Respondent's Brief, p.8.)

However,

Mr. Payne has not, on appeal or at the trial level, ever attempted to argue that he did
not possess the methamphetamine and, as such, the legal standards for possession
provide little insight to the issues at hand. Admitting the actual commission of a crime is
essential to showing that an individual had a defense to their actions. If Mr. Payne had
not blatantly admitted that he had possessed the methamphetamine, then his intent or
motive for doing so would not be relevant.
The

State

recognizes

that

Mr.

Payne

admitted

to

possessing

the

methamphetamine, notes that Mr. Payne's intention to deliver the methamphetamine to
police does not disprove his actual or constructive possession, and then concludes that
because intent evidence does not rebut actual or constructive possession there is no
constitutional right to present the evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) What is lacking
from this is a basic understanding of the presentation of a defense to charged conduct.
One can think of hundreds of examples where a defendant admits to criminal conduct,
yet offers a defense that does not rebut the occurrence of criminal behavior, but
negates criminal culpability.

Most of these examples rely on an individual's intent in

committing the offense: battery but with self-defense; theft but with a mistaken belief
that the individual owned the property; and so on. Under the State's theory, intent could
never be relevant; an idea just as absurd as if Mr. Payne had argued that intent was
always relevant in every case regardless of circumstance.
Mr. Payne argued that based upon the specific facts of this case, his intent was
relevant and provided information necessary for his defense: that he was turning the
methamphetamine into police; that he believed he was acting on their behalf; and that
he only possessed the methamphetamine long enough to complete this act. The State
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has taken the time to address each of the cases Mr. Payne supplied in support of his
assertion that motive or intent can be relevant and that it can be error for the district
court to limit or exclude intent testimony. 1 (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) It is true, as
the State asserts, that when taken at their most literal meaning the cases establish:
that evidence of why an employee wrote out a check on his employer's
account is relevant to whether the employee had intent to embezzle;
evidence of whether a banker orally clarified a false report was relevant to
whether he intended to deceive with the false report; and evidence of
whether a rancher corralling sheep had intent to deprive the sheep from
their owner is relevant to grand larceny.
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) However, these cases also clearly stand for the proposition
that whenever motive or intent of the accused is relevant to an issue in the case, the
trial court must allow for the presentation of such evidence.

See generally State v.

Jones, 25 Idaho 587 (1914), State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253 (1915), and State v. Hopple,
83 Idaho 55 (1960). Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Payne does not argue that
there is a "free-standing defense of proper motive" (Respondent's Brief, p.8), but argues
that motive or intent can be and, in this case, is relevant.
In this case, Mr. Payne's intent was relevant as to his asserted defense. From
the very beginning of trial, Mr. Payne noted that his defense was going to be that he did
possess metharnphetamine, but for a limited time and only to turn it in to law
enforcement so that it could be properly disposed of. (Tr., p.80, Ls.2-6.) Later, defense
counsel argued that "if a citizen believes he is acting to help enforce the law, he should
be able to present that to the jury and have them review that." (Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184,
L.2.)

As such, Mr. Payne's defense was that he was acting on behalf of law

1

Specifically, these cases are State v. Jones, 25 Idaho 587 (1914), State v. Givens, 28
Idaho 253 (1915), and State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55 (1960).
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enforcement by turning the methamphetamine over to police as quickly as possible.
Under LC. § 18-201 (3), Mr. Payne was not a person capable of committing a crime as
he committed the act of possessing methamphetamine through the misfortune of having
the substance thrown to him, although he did not want it.

He did not have any "evil

design" and did not intend to possess it under any traditional theory, but instead had
only the intent to dispose of it and remove it from his presence in what he believed was
a legal way.

Testimony about intent or motive is crucial to the presentation of this

defense.
Mr. Payne requests that this Court carefully consider the issue presented in this
case.

Under the State's position there is no way for a citizen to turn in illegal

substances to the police. If their intent in conducting limited possession on behalf of law
enforcement is not relevant to a possession charge defense, no individual can, in any
circumstance, no matter how noble, possess an illegal substance without a wellfounded fear of felony prosecution and, for that matter, a sure conviction. Following the
State's logic, if any citizen discovers illegal substances, they are better off leaving them
alongside the road for a child to find and ingest, than collecting them and turning them
into police.

This issue is of too great of importance to leave up to prosecutorial

discretion alone. In this case, intent or motive is relevant when offered as a defense.
As such, the district court interfered with Mr. Payne's right to due process by
denying him the ability to present his defense, including testimony about his intent.
Accordingly, Mr. Payne's conviction must be vacated.

8

CONCLUSION
Mr. Payne respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remanded his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day of May, 2012.

ELIZABET~~-;N~ ALL~-;; (
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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